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INVESTIGATION INTO LOW-COST PROPULSION SYSTEMS
FOR SMALL SATELLITE MISSIONS
.lerry .Ion Sellers. Alalcolm Paul, ,Maarten Meerman & Robert Wood
Umversity of Surrey. Guildford. Surrey_ U.K.

Abstract

introduction

LO\\ -cost satellites need low-cost propulsion
systems. The research sUl1U11arised in this paper
has focused on investigating low-cost
propulsion system options for small satellites
\\Ith specific application to the upcoming
UoSA T -12 minisatellite mission. The research
began b~ looking at available propulsion
system wchnology
Low-cost spacecraft
cngineenng techl1Iques were then explored to
identify specific systcm cost dnvers for further
investigation
This led to parallel research
efforts aimed at ( I ) basic research &
development into hybrid rockets to characterise
their applicability to 100v-cost spacecraft. and
(2) applied research into low-cost spacecraft
systems engineering-to design and implement
a system for UoSA T -12. The experimental
results from a 400-Newton thrust hydrogen
peroxide and polyethylene hybrid motor are
presented. Initial results indicate that >90~(1
combustion efficiency is achievable and an
experimental hybrid mission could feasibly be
developed over the next fe\\ years. Additional
. research into low-cost propulSIOn is also
discussed mcluding the application of a lo\\,thrust
(20-Ne\\10n) bl-propellant rocket
engine-the LEROS-20. devdoped by British
Aerospace. Royal Ordnance Rocket Motors
DiviSIOn.
The combination of innovative
manufacturing techmques along with low-cost
procurement practices makes this engine an
attractive. low-cost option. Finally. research
lI1to decreasmg the cost of support subsystems
has lead to a simple. low-cost design which IS
bell1g Implemented Oil UoSA T -12 at a fraction
of the cost of that predicted by industrystandard models.

The UniverSity of Surrey satellite research
group (UoSA T) is a world leader in 100\-cost.
small satellite engineering. To achievl.: high
reliability at an affordable price. the UoSA T
philosophy has emphasised simple. flexibk
designs with maximum use of off-the-shelf
terrestrial hardwarc
Evolved over II
missions. the 50 kg UoSAT. gravity-gradient
stabilised microsatellites have performed a
variety of miSSIOns in LEO. However. for
these small satellites to continue to evolve
economically beyond the niche of LEO and
exploit emerging new opportunities such as
more ambitious communication. remote sensing
and science missions. a larger. more flexible
bus with a propulsion capability is essential.
To pursue this goaL UoSAT researchers.
sponsored by Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd.
(SSTL). han: undertaken the deSign of a
modular. multi-miSSIOn minisatellite bus The
UoSA T -12 mission IS the maiden flight of thiS
ne\\ platfom1 Intended as a technolog~
demonstratIon mission. it will bl.: launched from
Baikonur Cosmodrome in October 1996 aboard
a Rockot booster. The UoSA T and SSTL
minisatellite bas an approximate mass of 250
kg. The minisatellite structural design builds on
the modular approach used in UoSAT
microsatellites in a wa~' that allO\vs maximum
re-use of subs:vstems bet\\een the t\\O
platforms.

.

~

Along
with
enhancements
to
the
communications. data handling and attitude
control systems. UoSAT -12 \vill include an
experimental low-cost propulsion system
derived from our resl;:arch.
A diagram of
UoSA T -12 is ShO\VI1 in Figure 1. The ilV
budgets for the UoSA T -12 propulsion system
include ~200 111/S for orbit COrrl;:ctlOI1 and
maintenance in addition to ~200 Nms for
supplementary attitude controL

spacecraft systems engineering, going beyond
the "paper study" phase to determine the
actual, achievable cost savings.

Propulsion System Options
';.,-

From a conceptual standpoint. propu)sion
system technology can be divided roughly-into
four categories based on tlte method used to
accelerate the reaction mass.
These- are
summarised below along with the approximate
specific impulse, Isp, for each. Isp is a useful
measure of engine efficiency. much ~Iike
miles-per-gallon for cars. (Here we focus only
on current or near-tenn technology. For a list
of more far-out ideas-fusion, anti-matter,
negative matter, etc.-the reader is referred to
l
Humble ).

• Cold-gas systems-use the energy of a gas
stored at high pressure to accelerate the. gas
to high velocity through a nozzle. Isp 70
seconds.
• Chemical systems:"'-"use the energy inherent
in chemical bonds released through
catalytic action or combustion to produce
high temperature exhaust products which
are then expanded out a nozzle to?igh
velocity. Isp - 300 seconds.
.
• Nuclear systems-use the intense heat
generated by nuclear fission (or fusion) to
heat up an inert reaction mass (sud; as
hydrogen) to high temperature. The mass
is then expanded out a nozzle to ,high
velocity. Isp - 1000 seconds.
• Electric systems-use electrical energy to
accelerate a reaction mass either through
electrothermal,
electromagnetic
. or
electrostatic means to high velocity. Isp10,000 seconds.

Figure 1: The UoSA T-12 spacecraft based on
the new UoSATISSTL modular minisatellite
bus.
The addition of propulsion represents a giant
step in tenns of UoSA T capability. Of course,
propulsion systems are an integral part of most
large spacecraft.
They enable orbit
manoeuvres, station keeping, constellation
maintenance and attitude control. However,
because of their prohibitive cost and
complexity, they are rarely found on very lowThe
cost missions such as UoSAT-12.
research summarised in this paper has focused
on investigating low-cost propulsion system
options and identifying specific applications
for this technology on small satellites. The
approach taken in the research-and
summarised in this paper-begins by looking
at available propUlsion system options. The
concept of low-cost spacecraft engineering is
then explored to understand why current
systems are so expensive and identify specific
cost drivers for further investigation.
This
leads to a discussion of parallel research
efforts aimed at (1) basic research &
development into alternative systemsspecifically hybrid rocket motor technologyto characterise its applicability to low-cost
spacecraft (2) applied research into low-cost

We can begin by examining the ele<:tric
options.
At first glance, the incredible
efficiency these
systems offer-which
translates into lower propellant rilass
requirements-seems ideal for small sate-Ilite
appliaations. However. there are two inherent
drawbacks to electrodynamics systems.
• Very low thrust
• Very high power requirements
The first drawback necessitates that for:any
significant manoeuvre. the engine must. be
kept on for a very long time. Because small
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spacecraft must be designed around the
system. This integration complexity increases
the cost of these systems significantly for
first-time use on a new satellite bus.
Furthermore, the toxicity of the propellants
make them a significant safety risk (which
further increases the cost). Despite this, liquid
bi-propellant
engines
using
storable
propellants are the "work horses" of the
satellite industry. They are used in every
aspect of propulsion-launch. orbit insertion,
orbit manoeuvre, orbit correction and attitude
control, They have been to the surface of the
Moon and are on their way to the stars.
Because they are such an industry standard, a
vast infrastructure already exists to support
their operations. Thus. they \\ arrant serious
consideration in any analysis of small satellite
application. The challenge is to drive down
their cost.

satellites are generally not in a hurry, this is
not necessarily a problem. However, to take
advantage of this engine efficiency the thrust
vector needs to be continually pointed in an
optimum direction, requiring a more complex,
continuous 3-axis control system. Again. this
may not be overly constraining for a low-cost
system.
Unfortunately, it is the second
drawback of electrodynamic systems that is
the hardest to overcome.
Discussion of
electric propulsion typically focuses on thrust
level per
of input power. Even a
modest svstem such as the augmented
hydrazine 'resistojet built by Olin Ae;ospace 2
in the U.S.A. produces relatively high th~ust
(0.27 N) at an impressive 300 sec Isp but with
a power requirement of SOO W. With a total
available power in the UoSAT minisatellite
system of less than 100 W. electric propulsion
systems
had
to
be excluded
from
consideration due to these excessivc power
requirements. Similarly, nuclear systems were
excludcd from consideration for practical
reasons.

The only remaining chemical system to
consider is the hybrid. There are currently no
commercially available hybrid systems. So
far, hybrids have only seen service in a limited
role on sounding rockets. No hybrid rocket
has ever been used in space. However. as we
will present, hybrid rockets offer many
inherent advantages which make them a prime
candidate for low-cost application on small
satellites. A large part of our research has
focused on hybrid systems, in basic and
applied research into finding ways to realise
their potential.

Thus. the potential shopping list quickly
comes down to chemical (solid, liquid and
hybrid) and cold-gas systems. Solid motors
can only be used once, therefore. for multiple
bums, multiple motors-with all the
additional overhead that entails-must be
employed. Furthermore, you are slaved to only
a few potential suppliers and their "off-theshelf" motors.
Costs of custom-designed
motors go up dramatically. For these reasons,
and because of the requirement for a flexible
orbital manoeuvring and orbit correction
system for the minisatellite, solid motors were
not considered in our research.

Finally, there are cold-gas systems. Because
of their very low lsp. cold-gas systems are
really only practical in the attitude control and
minor orbit correction role. However, both
liquid and hybrid systems require pressurised
gas to deliver the propellant to the combustion
chamber. Therefore. when either of these two
systems are employed for primary orbit
manoeuvring, the cold-gas system can be had
"for free" for attitude control applications.

The most widely available liquid systems rely
on storable propellants, primarily hydrazine
used as a mono-propellant at an lsp of 21S240 seconds or hydrazine (or its derivatives
such as monomethyl hydrazine (MMH),
UDMH. Aerozine-SO, etc.) with nitrogen
tetroxide (NTO) used in a bi-propellant
system with an lsp of around 300 seconds.

.-Defining a Low-cost SYstem

What is a "low-cost propulsion system?"
There is an expression which goes-"you get
what you pay for." Large space programmes
for multinational communications or manned
space flight can usually justify every cent of

As a satellite designer, its important to keep in
mind that even with "off-the-shelf' liquid
systems, they can not be just "bolted-on,"
ready to fly. In fact, to a large extent, the

3

gas (6.3 litre @ N e, 200 bar, 24.87 cm
diameter).
• Orbit Correction !J. V = 200 m/s.
• Bi-propellant engine Isp = 290 sec
• Standard system architecture

their enormous expenditure on system quality
and product assurance. The potential price for
failure is extremely high: billions of dollars or
human lives. However, propUlsion systems
for small satellites, especially on low-cost,
higher risk missions, would not be feasi~le if
implemented on the same basis. One of the
objectives of our research was to deter.mine
how best to design, implement and ope(pte a
propulsion system on a small satellite platform
while carefully trading off cost, risk' and
performance.

gives an overall propulsion system cost
estimate as summarised in Table I. (They
worked in accounting units where lAU ==
$0.98US. For simplicity we will assume lAU
$IUS).
We can conclude from this analysis that. at
first glance, a small satellite designer is faced
with propulsion system costs of >$600k in
non-recurring mission design costs in addition
To make
to around $700k per mission.
matters worse, by the nature of the small
satellite industry, "production runs" of
spacecraft are virtually unheard of. All
technology development costs must be funded
"in-house" and charged against the first
mission. There is no external customer to pass
on these costs to and no easy way to amortise
these costs over several missions. Thus. there
is a very sensitive "enabling cost" level for
new technology systems, meaning that below
this enabling level the mission can proceed.
Above this level the mission is not feasible.

Svstem Cost Models
The most important question to be answered
before designing a "low-cost" system is '-'what
does a high-cost system cost?" Unfortunptely,
because of the complexity involved~ith
adapting an existing system to a new mission,
the answer to this question is not necessarily
3
straight-forward. In 1984, Smith and Horton
did a comprehensive survey of available
propulsion systems and developed· cost
functions to allow us to make basic system
cost estimates for engines, tanksandcither
components.
Applying their cost relationships to: the
following mission scenario:
•
•

Spacecraft deployed mass == 250 kg .
Shell tanks for oxidiser, fuel (10 litre.each
@ 20 bar, 27.18 cm diameter, 1.65: I
oxidiserlfuel (O/F) ratio) and pressurant

Table 1: Smith & HorlOn cost model applied to a 250 kg spacecraft with a 200 mls !J.V requirement
along with cold-gas thrusters based on standard :.ystem architecture.

I

Liquid Engine
Propellant Tank
Nitrogen Tank
Regulator
Pressure Transducer
Pyro Valve
Relief Valve
Filter
Fil\!Drain Valve
Cold-Gas Thruster
Thruster Iso Valve (pyro)

I

Qty.

I

2
1
1
4
-'"

I
3
5
12
2

.

Unit.Mass
Total
(kg)
Mass (kg)
3.36
1.00
3:36
0.84
0:23
0.15
0.45
0.13
0.15
0.100
0.15

3.36
2.00
3.36
0.84
0.92
0.44
0.45
0.68
0.73
1.20
0.29

S200,000
S14,775
S12,370
S30,000
S6,500
, S2,500
S10,000
$4,000
S2,700
S20,OOO
S2.500

NonRecurring
Cost
$150.000
S]08,720
S99,480
$100,000
20000
S50,000
S80,OOO
S30,000
SlO,OOO
S100,000
$50.000

Total First
spacecraft
cost
$350.000
S138.270
Sl1 1,850
S130.000
S21,495
S57,500
$90.000
$42,000
$23,500
$340.000
S55.000

S711,415

$648,200

S1.359.615

Recurring
Cost

.

.'

!Total
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I
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(usually provided in a several inches thick
document e.g. NASA, ESA or DoD
programme specifications).
minin:1Um
2. Individual
components
at
possible cost as the result of relaxatioh of
requirements as addressed in the attached
RFQ and modification of your nQ[mal
production process.

Therefore, the challenge we faced was to find
ways. within the context of "faster, better.
cheaper" paradigm for which the small
satellite community has always been known,
to substantially reduce the overall system cost.
In the next subsections we will break apart
these high costs to determine the primary cost
drivers and then pull together basic system
engineering approaches for reducing them.

Unfortunately, response to this RFQ was .Iess
than overwhelming.
Only 12 compa.nies
provided serious responses to any components.
These responses are summarised in Tab1e 2
(because most companies only providecr the
second type of bid asked for, minimum c-ost.
only those results are reported).

Market Analysis
While these cost models are useful to gIve a
starting point for a paper-study mission, a
"reality check" of the industry is necessary in
order to proceed with a real mission. To
quantify price ranges and availability of
propulsion system components for UoSA T-12,
we prepared a formal Request for Quotation
(RFQ) which was sent to nearly 30 different
aerospace companies. The RFQ component
requirements were based on a conceptual
propulsion system design using the 20-Nev\'ton
bi-prope l1ant thruster as described later in this
paper.

Table 2: Results of market anaZysis.
Represents first-unit cost (including 110nrecurring cost).

In the cover letter, we tried to establish a
rapport with the supplier to get them to work
\vith us to lower costs.
We wrote: "Our
experience in building other satellite systems
has demonstrated that there are ways to lower
component costs by relaxing performance
requirements and judiciously modifying the
procurement and parts production process.
We know that a $50,000 component cannot
simply be changed into a $20,000 component
by changing the amount of paperwork that gets
shuffled. We recognise that the less expensive
component can not have the same assured
quality as its more expensive counterpart,
however, in many cases it may be sufficient
for our higher-risk, low-cost missions. We are
asking Yill! to tell us how best to reduce the
cost of each component with understandable
consequences."

•
•
•
•

$15,000 - $208.000
$15,000 - $27.200
$4,000 - $25.600
$4,000 - $16,000

•
•
•
•

Pressure regulator

•

Cold-gas thruster
isolation valve
Cold-gas thruster valve
Propellant check valves

•

$12.000 (one bid)~
$25,600 (one bid)
$350 (one bid)
$675 (terrestrial model)
- $30.000 (space
model)
$3.950 - $30.000·(one
bid)
$3.100 - $1 1.117

•
•

$2.525 - $12.560 .
$24.000 (one bid)

Using the lowest priced components, we. can
develop a modified-more realistic-budget
for the small satellite propulsion system priced
above. As \ve did not get a separate bid for the
engine, we use the same value (combi'~ing
recu~~jng and non-recurring costs) to get a
revised total system price for the. first
spacecraft of $588,125. While this is a
significant savings from the one predicted by
the cost modeL it is still quite dear. For il
minisatellite with a total budget of $4M, the
propulsion system alone would cons'-!,me
nearly 15%. But to get the cost of "the

Companies were given an abbreviated set of
component requirements and asked to provide
two separate quotations:
I. Individual components in compliance with
all typical industry standard performance
requirements and acceptance testing

I

a

Bid Range.

Component
N2 Tank
Propellant Tank
N2 Fill/drain valve
Propellant FilJldrain
valve
Pyrotechnic valve
N2 or Propellant Filter
Pressure Transducers
Pressure Relief valve

5

propulsion system down any more requires a
more basic understanding of the fundamental
cost drivers for space hardware. We will
explore these cost drivers in the next section.
.',

promlsmg low-cost terrestrial hardware must
be rejected due to materials or other aspects
that are incompatible with space. In this way.
the space environment serves as a hard driver
of the technical approach that must be used.

Cost Drivers

In addition, there is an equally constraining
political environment which is just as hard to
ignore. It is an unfortunate but true fact of life
that the optimum engineering solution is often
irrelevant in the face of political demands.
Any discussion of options for buying or
producing
low-cost
propulsion
system
hardware can only be effective once this basic
context is understood. While the purely
technical side of this political environment
determines the "acceptable risk" of a given
engineering solution, the political dimension
determines "allowable risk."

Why are propulsion systems specifically. and
spacecraft in general, so expensive? Some,
4
like space economist Chris Elliot argue that
space missions are so' expensive simply
because we expect them to be. When one
assumes missions are high-cost, then decisions
are made which turn this into a self-fulfilling
prophecy e.g. higher cost == fewer missions
higher reliability demands = higher cost. To
break out of this vicious circle, you must first
accept that space missions can be inexpensive.
Only then can decisions be made which to
allow this to happen.

What is "acceptable risk?" This is perhaps
one of the most important, but least politically
correct questions that can be asked for any
miSSIOn. Risk. or its inverse reliability. is
something that should be budgeted along with
power, mass and every other precious
commodity on a spacecraft. In the traditional
'vicious circle' of high-cost missions. risk was
something that had to be minimised throughout the entire system. But, of course. trying to
operate inside a very tight 'risk margin' can be
very expensive.

As part of our research, we defined a generic,
systematic process for space hardware
selection in an attempt to identify the primary
cost drivers. We can divide the evolution of a
mission into three phases:
•
•
•

Mission Definition
Mission Design
Procurement

We can then isolate significant cost drivers
within each phase.
Mission Definition Phase

Obviously. if designers were willing to accept
higher risk. mission cost could be reduced.
But 100:v-cost and high-risk are relative terms.
While a large government programme may
view a $lIvl microsatellite mission as
inexpensive. they may not be prepared to
accept additional risk for political reasons. On
the other hand. if a University is paying for it,
$1 M is viewed as a significant portion of the
research budget. yet they may be more willing
So, the trick in low-cost
to accept risk.
engiI]~ering is to effectively spend the risk
budget to achieye the best return. One way to
do this is to look for areas where you are
paying for the same risk reduction more than
once.
And to best understand that. the
majority of risk should be centred \\ithin the

Despite the best cost-cutting attention of any
engineer or programme manager, there are
certain harsh realities of planning and
operating space missions that cannot be simply
budgeted away.
During the Mission
Definition Phase, the "who, what, where, why
& when" of the mission is addressed. The
answers to these questions determine the entire
mission environment.
There are two aspects of this environment that
are among the biggest cost drivers for space
hardware. Perhaps the most obvious of these is
the punishing physical environment of space:
radiation, vacuum, etc. Any potential hardware
options must be screened and tested to ensure
they will function in this harsh environment.
Because of this hard constraint, some
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technical options that can be considered. For
example, mission ~ V requirements. coupled
with mass constraints, can limit you to
consider only propulsion options with a
sufficiently high Isp.
Unfortunately.
requirements cost money. Furthermore. for
most sYstems there is an exponential
relationship between performance (whether
measured in reliability. specific impulse or
bits/sec) and cost. This simple point can not
be overemphasised to the entire design team.
By carefully considering the impact of each
requirement on the total system in some cases
it may be possible that by simply relaxing a
single requirement by 10%. the overall savings
could be many times that.

prime contractor or rationally shared with
subcontractors,
Regardless of how cleverly you can manage to
cut corners on a particular engineering
solution and how confident you are it will
actually work, if your customer or the launch
authority cannot be convinced the risk is
acceptable then it will not be allowed.
Fortunately. within the. context of small
missions, especially those done by University
researchers. the customer and the designer are
sometimes one and the same. When you are
your own customer, you are more likely to
fully. appreciate all the mission trade-offs and
therefore more willing to raise the threshold of
acceptable risk.

Another point to consider is the performance
margin. Margin is the engineering tolerance
given to a particular specifications.
For
~xample, specifications for an engine inlet
psi. The smaller
pressure may be 250 psi
the gap between a system's performance and
its specification, the more it will cost to ensure
compliance. Over-specifying the margin can
needlessly drive up the cost.
Low cost
spacecraft engineering focuses on increasing
such margins by controlling requirements.
This can lead to a wider range of possible
solutions as well as less testing and analysis.
By changing the margin for inlet pressure
specification in the above example to 0 psi.
very little is lost in overall performance but it
becomes much easier and cheaper to ensure
compliance and less sensitive to small changes
in configuration or performance of related
support systems,

For propulsion systems, an important
controller of acceptable risk is the launch
authority. In addition to requirements and
constraints specifically spelled out by the
launch agency, the launch site management
may have other rules and regulations to which
you must comply. For example, propulsion
systems to be used \vith launch operations out
of Vandenberg AFB m California are
governed bv WRR 127-1 Range Safety
Requirement~5. In addition to this regulation,
Military Standards dictate requirements for
specific components, for example MIL-STD6
1522A
covers
"Standard
General
Requirements for Safe Design and Operation
of Press uri sed Missile and Space Systems."
Mission Design Phase
Once the mission is defined, the top-down
Mission Design Phase can begin in earnest.
During this phase many key designs and
philosophies are established which serve as
important cost drivers for spacecraft hardware.
Among the most critical of these for
'propulsion
systems
are
fundamental
performance requirements and constraints,
with corresponding margins, and the basic
system architecture definition.

Required quality level can also be considered
of
hardw'are
requirements.
as
part
Unfortunately, there is no industry accepted
definition of what makes a particular
component "space qualified."
The most
obvious justification, of course. would be if a
comp6nent had actually been used in space for
some considerable length of time under similar
operating conditions without failure. As any
engineer knows, no amount of testing or
analvsis can completely guarantee that a
particular component will never fail. But

The cost impact of specific mission
performance requirements and their associated
margins can ripple through an entire system.
To begin with, these determine the range of

7

attempting to manage this uncertainty is what
the whole "space qualified" process is about.
A simple bolt is a classic example of how the
most basic of components can attract
expensive precautions. In all probability, a
bolt bought at the local hardware store would
perform adequately on a spacecraft. However,
parts used for space missions are typically
procured to specifications requiring particular
titanium aJloys, traceability of raw materials,
precision threads and high torque heads. The
cost of such a bolt may be hundreds of times
more expensive than the hardware store
This is in addition to the
equivalent.
administration cost of writing and maintaining
the specifications, ensuring the high-quality
parts remain traceable and not forgetting that
specialised heads require specialised tools and
specialised suppliers. Even so, this is often
considered necessary in the effort to manage
the uncertainty of mission success: one rogue
bolt may make all the difference.
To understand this uncertainty management
process for specific pieces of hardware, let us
imagine a quality spectrum for components.
This "quality spectrum" can be defined in
terms of increasing confidence or reliability as
you start at one end with commercial or
industrial grade components and then move up
to High REL and finally Space Qualified at the
top end. These are listed below in increasing
order of "quality":

System architecture is a broad term used to
describe the selection, deployment and
interaction of components within a system. It
is another cost driver established during
Mission Design. For propulsion systems, this
process determines the "plumbing" lay-out of
the tanks, valves and engines and their concept
for operations. This is fundamentally a design
exercise that ultimately determines the number
and type of components used. During this
process, cost vs. performance trade-offs are
identified. The decisions made will directly
corresponds to system cost.
Several important philosophies are established
during the system architecture process which
also directly drive cost. One of these is the
approach to redundancy. In the realm of lowcost, small satellites, true I: I hardware
redundancy is virtually impossible.
The
additional
mass,
power
and
volume
requirements of flying complete back-up
systems, in addition to the additional overhead
required to manage this redundancy, is
prohibitive. Yet, even on low-cost missions,
single-point failures, while inevitable, must be
dealt with.
Thus, systems design engineers must balance
the trade-off between two
competing
philosophies: (I) "all single point failures are
bad", and (2) "if it ain't there, it can't fai I."
On the one hand, you would like multiple
paths (e.g. valves) to ensure gas or propellant
flow in case of failure. On the other hand,
each additional valve leads to additional leak
paths, wiring, software, mass and cost.
Designers
must
carefully
review
the
acceptable risk associated with the entire
system and try to establish an approach which
balances this risk against cost and complexity .

I. Commercial/industrial grade components
2. Military Spec or military standard
"MiISPEC/MiIStd"

may never have actually flown in space rather
than use one that is subjectively qualified but
lacks all the necessary paperwork.

or

3. High reliability or "HiRel"
4. Space Qualified or "SpaceQual"
It is important to realise that there are
objective measures of "space qualified," e.g.
formal certification through rigorous testing,
as well as subjective measures, e.g. you have
flown it in space before and it worked.
Ironically, the political environment may be
such that the subjective criteria is not enough.
A customer or launch authority my demand
you use a component with an objective
certification of "space quality" even though it
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Table 3: Summary of advantages and disadvantages associated with buying vs. buildingf!ight
hardware.
Option
Buying Hardware

Building Hardware

•t:
,•
•,
I
•a

-.

1

'\

I

,
I

YOU ...
• Control sharing of risk with
supplier
Get
tried and tested hardware
•
Have
no development costs
•
Learn
from subcontractors
•
YOU ...
Control the specifications and
performance
Control the design and
interfaces
• Control the schedule
Control the cost
• Spend overhead in-house
Gain expertise that should make
it even cheaper next time

•

.I

Disadvantages

Advantages

•

•

YOU, ..
Have less control over
'.
specifications
Have less control over schedule
'.,
and cost
• Spend overhead outside your
organisation
YOU ...
..
• Carryall the risk
• Need the in-house expertise to
design the entire component
..
and manufacture it
-.
• Need to acceptance test it
• Need to space qualify it

•

:~~

•

~

•

satellite builder and subcontractors. the
method for handling system specifications,
type and amount of documentation and overall
project management. At each step of the
process, there are opportunities to decrease (or
increase) the final cost of the hardware. ,The
challenge is to develop a working relation-ship
with suppliers that allows you to conduct
business with the minimum of documentation,
.,
meetings and overhead.

Procurement Phase
Once you know what components you want,
you have to procure them. This is not a trivial
exerc ise.
The procurement practices and
process used have a profound cost impact
giving you a drastically reduced (or increased)
price for essentially identical hardware.
Where can you get low-cost space hardware?
Some low-cost missions have the luxury of
being able to "borrow" donated hardware or
purchase flight spares for a much reduced
price. Unfortunately these situations, while
they can be found (if you are willing to look
hard enough, hat-in-hand) do not offer a
repeatable system. Thus, to build a series of
low-cost satellites using the same basic
propulsion system you are left with two
options:

When it comes to building your own
hardware, the primary advantages you gain are
111
increased control over a particular
component.
This of course creates. the
potential for cost savings, but by no means
guarantees it. The disadvantages flow from
;he hassle caused by having to do it all
yourself. Once you have made the decision to
build, the basic steps in the manufacturing,
integration and testing processes differ very
little from those used throughout industry.'

1. Buying flight hardware through normal
procurement channels, or
')

Whether you choose to buy or build 'your
hardware, somehow you must test it sO'you
will' flave some confidence it will work in
space. On one hand. testing is essential to
ensure compliance with requirements. On the
other hand, it can be a tremendous drain on
resources-time. money and manpower:--to
conduct. review and document the testing.
For a low-cost system. you only want· to

Building your own flight hardware.

Each of these options has their advantages and
disadvantages as well as corresponding cost
implications as summarised in Table 3.
One very important cost driver associated with
buying hardware deserves special attentionthe procurement process itself. This has to do
with division of risk between the primary
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no hybrid rocket has ever been used or even
tested in space. However, as we will see.
hybrid rockets offer several exciting features
that made them the logical candidate for a
build-your-own, low-cost rocket. Additional
background work on our research can be
found in the March 1995 Journal of the British
InterplanetGlY Sociel),16.
.

perform the testing that is absolutely
necessary and avoid those that are frivolous or
redundant.
. But how much testing is enough? To answer
this question, it is important to distinguish
between qualification and acceptance testing.
Qualification tests are used to check the
manufacturing process and determine whether
the product complies with specifications.
Once a component has passed this hurdle.
much less demanding acceptance tests are
done to individual components to screen them
for basic functionality. Unfortunately, many
spacecraft components do not come off
production lines and so satellite builders are
forced to do both qualification and acceptance
testing which drives up the cost. However.
components are often subjected to a variety of
tests following manufacture e.g. vibration,
and then. once fitted into a subassembly are
tested again and then, yet again when the
subassembly goes into the spacecraft. While
these multi-levels of testing do help to screen
out faulty parts, they create additional costs
which small satellite designers can ill-afford.

A typical hybrid rocket motor (by convention.
hybrids are called motors whi Ie all-liquid
systems are called engines) consists of a solid
fuel and a liquid oxidiser. Start-up involves
openmg a single valve. allowing the
pressurised oxidiser to flow into the
fuel/combustion chamber where combustion
takes place either spontaneously or with an
ignitor.
Laying somewhere between a traditional
liquid engine and solid motors. it is often said
that a hvbrid "combines the best of both
worlds 7 ,,- As such. hybrid rockets have
several inherent advantages. Hybrids:
•

Our Approach
•
•

With this background understood, we set
about designing a low-cost propulsion system
for the UoSA T-12 spacecraft, mindful that this
was to be an in-orbit demonstration mission of
a generic bus to be used for several follow-on
mIssIons.
Thus, we needed to focus on
repeatable solutions. From a cost standpoint.
we split the system into two separate piecesthe main engine and the support components
(tanks, valves, etc.). In the interest of basic
engineering research. we chose to investigate
the option of building our own main engine
while pursuing in parallel the application lowcost system design and procurement
techniques to bought-in engines and support
components. A discussion of the preliminary
results of these efforts will be the focus of the
following sections.

•

•
•

Can be easily turned off by stopping the
flow of oxidiser and then restarted at a later
time.
Can be throttled.
Have a comparable Isp to storable bipropellants, and, with oxidiser to fuel
combinations at high ratios (8: I or greater),
their density Isp (the product of Isp and
average specific gravity of the propellants)
is well above liquid bi-propellant systems.
ese readily available fuels such as HTPB
(rubber) or polyethylene (plastic) and
oxidisers such as liquid oxygen (LOX) or
hydrogen peroxide.
Have environmentally friendly exhaust
products.
Are extremely safe-it is virtually
impossible for a hybrid to explode.

A hybrid rocket combines the storability of a
solid system with the restart and throttle
capability of a liquid system. Perhaps most
important, the inherent simplicity and design
robustness of hybrids make them ideal for safe
experimentation and development within a
university environment. Thus. they promise a
low-cost, easy-to-use propulsion option
worthy of further study.

Hybrid Rocket Development
The Hybrid Option
As discussed above, there are currentlv no
"off-the-shelf'
hybrid
rocket
systems
available for use on small satellites. In fact,
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2. Test-Using this infrastructure and motor.
conduct basic research into hybrid
combustion characteristics
3. Assess-Along the way, gain sufficient
practical experience with hybrid r2C ket
design and operations to enable a crliical
assessment of cost schedule and Other
development requirements for a near~.ierm
space mission.

Therefore, one of the primary objectives of
our research was to establish whether or not
hybrid rockets really live up to their
expectations. After all. it is often the case in
engineering that a particular technology
application looks great
but in
practice is sorely lacking.
Beginning in April 1994. we undertook an
ambitious hybrid rocket research and
development programme. The fundamental
objectives were to assess the feasibility of
using hybrid rockets on small satellites.

Since then. a proof-of-concept motor has been
designed, fabricated and tested using ~5%
high test hydrogen peroxide (HTP) as .. the
oxidiser and polyethylene (PE) as the Iuel.
Figure 2 shows a cut-away drawing of the
motor attached to its support plate along with
a photograph of the entire test rig.

This feasibility was to be assessed using three
basic criteria:

1. Simplicity-defined in terms of ease of
design. fabrication and operations.
") Peljormance-defined
in
terms
of
measured vs. theoretical combustion
efficiency.

In operation, the HTP is injected into a
catalyst bed where it chemically decomposes
into superheated (>600°C) oxygen and st¢am.
These decomposition products are then vented
into the
combustion
chamber ~here
spontaneous ignition of the PE takes place.
Onboard a satellite. the HTP offers the added
advantage that it can also be used as a monopropellant with an Isp of around 140 seconds
for attitude control and minor orbit
corrections.

Cost-defined in terms of development and
operational cost of a flight motor as compared
to other low-cost options.From these basic
objectives,
we
developed
a
research
programme that encompassed the following
tasks:
1. Design-Starting from "scratch," establish
a hybrid development infrastructure and
proof-of-concept motor.

Figure 2: CUI-away drawing oj the University oj Surrey proof-oj-concept hybrid motor attached to
its support plate. Photograph shows test stand with support plumbing installed in test cell at Royal
Ordnance test Jacility, Westcott. u.K.
Load Cell

Catalyst Pack
Nozzle

\

.~

-.:::'-"cj__\

~combustion
~

Chamber

Test
Stand
Support Plate
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4. Efficient-as characterised by measured vs.

Throughout the programme, we were able to
gain access to various information which had
been unavailable at the start which helped to
steer the selection of HTP catalyst options. In
addition. as is often the case in applied
engineering research, adjustments were made
to the test apparatus and instrumentation along
the way. Throughout, this was very much a
learning process and we suffered a variety of
labour pains in the process of starting from
nothing and evolving an entire rocket research
and development infrastructure.

theoretical chamber temperature.

5. Minimum pressure drop-higher pressure
drop requires higher delivery pressure.
Unfortunately. our research revealed that,;these
characteristi~s are much easier stated:~ than
achieved. The search for the "holy grail:' of a
reliable and effective catalyst pac~, has
consumed the bulk of our rocket development
and experimentation thus far. This work was
somewhat frustrating because we knew that
reliable catalyst packs had been,-fully
developed and widely used in the 1950s and
60s. However. when HTP fell out of favour in
the early 60s. this technology was abandoned.
Thus, during our research at times w~ felt
more like archaeologists, trying to reconstruct
an ancient art from a few vague and dusty
scrolls, than a true rocket scientists.

The following is a list of just some of the
technical problems we had to overcome during
this effort.
• Obtaining a reliable supply of HTP
• Locating HTP-compatible valves
• Designing a nozzle insert capable of
withstanding the +2300°C temperature of
hybrid combustion and finding a company
to manufacture it.
•

•

We started out by looking for any
commercially available HTP
calalysts.
none
were
available.
Unfortunately.
Therefore, we had to develop our own. ,When
we began our system design, we had only a
sketchy description of the catalyst packs used
89
in earlier work . From these we were able to
determine some general guidelines for the
catalyst pack configuration and fix the basic
pack geometry (diameter and depth).

Selecting, procuring, integrating and
testing the hardware and software for data
collection and experimental control.
Designing, fabricating, installing 'and
testing a cavitating venturi to overcome
catalyst pack "wet-start" problems.

Results

What remained was finding a suitable catalyst
material to use. Unfortunately, descriptjons of
catalyst material were even more vague.
Davis 8 describes using samarium oxide treated
silver gauze.
The Hydrogen Peroxide
Handbo~k9 describes a variety of catalyst
types
including calcium
permanganate
"stones," silver gauze and silver-plated brass,
nickel and stainless steel gauze, 16 - 20 ,mesh.

Catalvst Pack Deyelopment
The hybrid combustion process actually
begins in the catalyst pack. In fact, it is
perhaps the w'eakest link in the chain. If the
catalyst pack does not work, the hybrid will
not ignite. Thus. as part of over-all system, a
reliable catalyst pack needs to initiate smooth,
rapid and complete decomposition of HTP
with minimum pressure drop across the pack.
Four specific catalyst pack design parameters
emerge from this description:

With only this to go on we started our
research. During the past year, we have
conducted over 50 catalyst pack firings. using
8 different catalysts with additional variations.
'
• 7),pe-J: Maximum density silver-plated
nickel gauze
• Type-2: Maximum surface area silverplated nickel gauze

1. Reliable-relatively long lifetime with
little degradation in performance, working
"first-time, every-time."

.

2. Smooth-no radical surges or oscillations
in \vorking pressure.
3. Rapid--decomposition time should be on
the order of tenths of seconds. "Wet starts"
should not be observed.

• Type-3: KMn04 crystals
• Type-2A: Type-2 catalyst. sintered Jor 30
min at 800°C
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Measured Steady-state Temperature vs. Theoretical Value for 5 different catalyst
conti gurati ons
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Figure 3: Summary of cata(vst pack test results. Graph shows the relationship between cumulative
HTP throughput and average steady-state temperature for various catalyst options.
.

•

hydrazine catalyst)

.

•

-rlpe-5: Silver-plated gauze provided by
the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA)

I'

•
•

Type-.JA: LCH 212 plus Shell 405
-rvpe-6: Permanganate stones provided by

I

•

-rvpe- '7: Silver-plated nickel gauze plated to
a modified specification provided by
British Aerospace, Royal Ordnance!o._

•

-rlpe-8: Pure silver gauze treated with
samarium nitrate!!.

I
I

•I
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As Figure 3 indicates, the best overall catalyst
we tested was the -rvpe-8 pure silver gauze.
This is a 40-mesh gauze of99.9%+ pure silver
treated in a 5% solution of samarium nitrate
(soaked for 25 minutes and then vacuum
dried). In practice we found that this very fine
mesh packed much more densely than the
silver-plated nickel gauze. As a result, we
ended lip with a catalyst pack which was
effectively shorter. However, this did not
noticeably reduce its performance. As of this
writing, the same catalyst pack containing the
silver gauze has been used for 8 30-second
firings at an HTP loading rate of ~ 75
kghn2/sec plus an additional 3 20-second
hybrid firings at a similar load rate with no
appreciable decrease in performance. Longer
term research will try to determine the
effective
lifetime
of
this
catalyst
configuration .

the USAF Rocket Lab. Edwards AFB.

For hybrid development work. we wer~ most
interested in catalyst performance' and
lifetime. Performance can be defined in terms
of measured decomposition temperature v~, a
theoretical value. Lifetime is defined by the
total throughput of HTP for a given pack with
units of kg/m::.
Unfortunately. there is a practical limit to the
lifetime issue due to finite HTP resources.
This was especially true early in the
programme when we only had 60 litres with
'which to experiment. Nevertheless. we were
able to characterise a definite trade-off
between performance and lifetime. This C'ln
be seen in Figure 3 which plots cumulative
throughput for the most reactive cataly~ts vs.
steady-state decomposition temperature. The
theoretical value of 634°C is includ-e,d for
comparison (derived using the USAF Isp

Hybrid Development
The. hybrid combustion process is actually
quite similar to that of a log in a fireplace.
The log of course is the fuel. Oxygen from
the air interacts with the fuel surface causing it .
to vaporise and burn. If more oxygen is
added-the basic function of a bellows-then
combustion takes place more rapidly. Hybrid
combustion theory attempts to describe and
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of the oxidiser which. in turn. determines the
rate of heat generated in the combustion zone.
In practice, this combustion or flame zone
exists within the boundary layer above the
solid fuel. Oxidiser enters the flame zone by
diffusion from the centre of the port. Fuel
enters as a result of vaporisation from the
.solid surface.

predict this process within the combustion
chamber. The simplest hybrid combustion
chamber is a solid rod of fuel with a
cylindrical port through the centre. Just like
the fireplace analogy. oxygen is added U.tJ- the
form of a suitable oxidiser) into the port:and,
in the presence of an ignitor (or with.preheated oxidiser) the fuel vaporises and starts
to burn.

Prediction of regression rate is fundamental to
hybrid rocket motor design. Unfortunately.
the regression rate constants can only be
determined empirically.
Therefore, the
primary goal of all basic hybrid rocket
combustion research is determining the
regression rate constants for a given propellant
combination. With these numbers in hand, the
designer can then tailor a hybrid motor to
support specific mission objectives.

The principle metric used for discussing the
hybrid combustion process is the rate at which
the fuel burns.
This speed of fuel
consumption is called the regression rate. In
harmony with common sense, theory desii"ribes
the regression rate as a function of the
concentration of fuel and oxidiser.
The
standard regression rate formula is no~ally
given as

.

The definitive paper which pre-dates our work
on HTPfPE hybrids was published by George
Moore and Kurt Berman in the November
1956 issue of Jet Propulsion 13. Their paper
describes work conducted several years before
(presumably kept secret until 1956) at the
General Electric Company as part of an Army
Ordnance contract. Moore and Berman used
the same HTPfPE combination we used
(although they had access to 90% HTP while
we have to get by on 85%). At the outset,
they list several desirable characteristics of
this particular hybrid combination:

(\)

where

r

fuel regression rate (m Is)

G total

=

total propellant (fuel plus oxidiser)

mass flux (kg I
X

/11

2

s)

= distance down the port (m)

a. n. m

=

regression rate constants,

characteristic ofthe propellants
Hybrid combustion differs from liquid and
solid combustion in that the process occurs as
a macroscopic diffusion flame.
That is,
combustion occurs in a region near the fuel
surface where the fuel and oxidiser
concentrations allow it. Typically, fue( is
concentrated near the solid fuel wall while
oxidiser is concentrated near the centre of the
port. The two mix through the diffusion
process. While oxidiser to fuel ratio, OfF, is
basically constant for liquid and solid rockets,
for hybrids this ratio gradually decreases
do\yn the length of the port. That is the reason
regression rate is shown as a function of x in
Eqn. (I).

1. Good theoretical specific impulse. Isp.
"') High average density.
3. Spontaneous ignition. usually after < 0.5
seconds .. In this way the fuel combustion
can be thought of augmenting the HTP
mono-propellant performance. "Ignition is
generally reliable and smooth over a \vide
range of oxidiser/fueI ratios."
4. With proper design of the engine and fuel
charge "hard" starts should never occur:
the peroxide decomposition product is a
gm;eous oxidiser and therefore cannot
accumulate in the combustion chamber
prior to ignition.
5. Intermittent operation and throttling can be
accomplished by means of a single valve in
the peroxide line.
6. The system has the simplicity of a monopropellant but with a safety, at a given

Theory, backed up by experimental evidence,
indicates that the rate of heat transfer to the
fuel and its heat of decomposition are the
controlling factors in combustion. The tate of
heat transfer is controlled by the rate of flow
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We achieved our first successful hybrid firing
in November 1994-just 7 months after our
programme began. Our experimental results
are quite encouraging and compare favouabJy
with the ground-breaking work of Moore and
Berman as well as the preliminary results of
Wernimont and Meyer. Table 4 gives specific
performance data for each test. Notice that
characteristic exhaust velocities (C*. an
effective measure of combustion efficiency)
exceed 87% and in most cases are greater than
90%. Figure 4 plots the results our 6 most
successful hybrid tests conducted to-date (we
had several cases of failed ignition due to
catalyst problems early in the programme)
against those
of Moore/Berman
and
Wernimont/Meyer. Our data appears to agree
more closely with the classic Moore/Berman
results with essentially the same slope to the
curve.

performance, probably unattainable with
most liquid mono-propellants.
7. The design and construction of the fuel
charge is not very critical in regard to the
presence of cracks or voids: there is verv
little possibility of an explosion of th~
entire propellant, and in these respects the
system is more desirable than most solid
propellants.

..

At the same time, thev noted onlv
. a few
disadvantages:
1. Relatively high freezing point and potential
instability ofHTP.
') Difficult to vary the fuel burning rate by
more than a factor two which can
complicate the fuel charge design for some
applications.
The remainder of their paper outlines the
results from over 300 tests! They used three
basic chamber designs-straight tube, rod &
tube and straight tubes with alternating inside
diameters to generate eddy currents for better
mixing. They used both extruded tube as well
as stacks of 112" plastic wafers (the fact that
the gaps between the wafers had no effect on
burning underscores how insensitive hybrids
are to cracks or voids in the fuel grain unlike
solid motors).

Conclusions
Our on-going investigation into hybrid rockets
as a low-cost alternative for small satellites
has proven the basic feasibility of the concept.
Overall. the hybrid system is safe and easy to
work with.
Good performance is readily
achievable. Estimates of development costs
and manpower, based on our experience,
indicates a proto-flight hybrid motor could be
ready for in-orbit demonstration in under 2
years.
Much
work
remains.
Future
publications will expand on our experimental
results and discuss the future objectives of this
research in greater detail.

With the exception of some work published in
l4
1970 by M. Pugibet and H. Moutet on
additives to hybrid fuel to initiate hypergolic
combustion with HTP, little was done with
HTP/PE hybrids until 1994. In that vear, we
began our work and E. Wernimon; and S.
Meyer at Purdue University in the U.S.
published some initial results from their
I5
\vork .

Table 4: Summary of tests results for University of Surrey hybrid motor.

I

Test

Burn
I Time
(sec)

I

I

Steady I Oxidiser Fuel
-state. mdot
mdot
(kg/s) (kg/s)
Pc
(bar) i
0.017
18.1
0.144

I Total

0.162

159.0

178.21

m/s)
4.84

8.3

Average Actual Ave, C*'hcory I 0/0
err,
C*
mdot (kg/m 1 (kg/m2/i regression. OIF
~ :
meas,.
sec)
rate (10'
(kgls)
sec)
G ox

Gtotal :

2

.

11482

1575

94%

10.2

1320

1522

87%

6.62

9.1

1395

1554

90%

183.3

4.05

10.1 • 1372

1522

90%

283.7

5.51

9.3

1447

1554

93%

1471

1568

94%

1

17.8

2

16.9

10.2

0.155

0.015

0.170

243.3

267.11

5.04

3

13.2

18.9

0.162

0.0]8

0.180

319.8 354.91

7

18.6

16.1

0.142

0.014

0.156

8

18.6

17.5

166.7
0.161 ! 256.1

0.016
0.022 • 0.165

9

I

18.2

18.2

I

0.145
0.143

I

I

223.1 I 256.7
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6.58

6.6

Regression Rate Data from Moore/Berman (M/B) and
WeinimontfMeyer (W/M) vs. Hybrid tests 1-3, 7-9 (SIP)
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Figure .J: Plot of Sellers/Paul (S/p) regression rate results 1'S. those reported by Moore/Berman l3
I5
and Wermm0I1I/}..1eyer . Notice closer agreement with the ]",flB results with same basic slope to the
regression rate equation.
Table 5 gives the basic specification for a
hybrid motor which could fulfil the
performance requirements for the UoSA T -12
mission compared to the LEROS-20, 20Newton bi-propellant engine discussed in the
next section. Notice that while the hybrid
rocket is slightly less efficient than the liquid
system, it has an advantage in density isp.
meaning you can package more deliverable
impulse for a given volume, Figure 5 shows
how such a system could be packaged within
the minisatellite structure.

....

Table 5: System parameters for a hybrid
motor to fulfil the UoSAT-12 missioll
requirements.

I

Parameter

Hybrid
Option
HTP/PE
8
80:1

LER~
Opti

Propellant(s)
MMH/MON
I
OIF
i
1.65
180: I
Nozzle Expansion
I
Ratio
22
Nominal Thrust (N)
500
I
290
Specific Impulse
280*
(sec)
I
8.88
Chamber Pressure
18
I
(bar)
Total thrust time
40 min
97 sec
(sec)
i
Total propellant
17
17.6
mass (kg)
14.6
Total propellant
13.5
volume (/)
I
337
Density lsp
364
*Assumes 90% of theoretical vacuum Isp
achievable.

Unfortunately, given the short time-line for
the UoSAT-12 mission it was not feasible to
consider the hybrid as a realistic option.
Luckily, parallel research had revealed
another attractive low-cost option .
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wavs to increase the reliability and
pe;formance of the engine while slashing the
production cost. By focusing on design and
manufacturing techniques the Royal Ordnance
team has been able to develop a production
engine at very low cost.
LEROS-20
Engine

..

~
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Figure 5: Cut-away diagram showing possible
configuration of a hybrid motor and support
tanks within the minisatellite structure.

Low-Thrust Bi-propellant

Engin~s

In parallel with longer-term research into the
viability of hybrid rocket systems. we
continued to look for other low-cost chi?mical
propulsion system options. Traditional large
spacecraft use large bi-propellant engines
(400+N) for major orbit correction. 'These
engines come with a comparably large pricetag (>$200,000) as indicated above. Therefore,
we had to look for a less expensive option. We
found one by taking the approach of adapting
mission requirements to fit an engine rather
than the traditional approach which IS the
other way around.

Figure 6: Diagram of LEROS-20 engine
integrated onto the attach fitting plate of the
UoSAT-J2 minisatellite. Propellant tanks are
shown on the other side of the attach plate.
Why are these engines a low~cost option for
small satellites? To begin with, these small
engines are produced in much larger numbers
than the 400-N version, thus we were more
likely to be able to take advantage of existing
production runs. In addition, because this is
the same engine repeatedly tested for large
expensive programs, direct evidence of basic
qualification was available without resort to
expensive, and in this case redundant,
qualification testing. As a result, 20-N engines
are generally 75% less expensive than their
larger, 400-N thrust big brothers.

British Aerospace, Royal Ordnance Rocket
Motors Division (RO) has a long hist~ry in
developing, testing and manufacturing bipropellant engines. RO. along with several
other manufacturers, make an industrystandard 20-Newton thrust engine burning
MMH/MON. These engines are used on large
satellite platforms for attitude control. Use on
a small spacecraft for primary propulsion
represents an innovative application of
existing technology, one that would offer a
relatively inexpensive engine that was already
supported by the industry.

On top of these basic savings, RO have been
able to reduce the cost of these engines by
nearlv an additional 50% through careful
atten;ion to design and manufacturing issues.
For any liquid engine. the two most important
design areas that effect performance are the
injection and the cooling. In the LEROS-20,
these" problems are handled together in a
synergistic way that achieves good reliable
performance at low cost. The engine is film
and radiation cooled yielding a simple, costeffective design. Furthermore, the film cooling
barrier allows the core combustion process to
be optimised for maximum performance.

A diagram of the LEROS-20 engine is shown
in Figure 6 integrated into the satellite attach
fitting base-plate. The engine itself is about
the size of a wine glass with a total mass of
0.45 kg. Propellant mass flow rate is on the
order of 7.5 gm/sec. This 20-Newton -;:thrust
engine represents years of research' and
development at Royal Ordnance in finding
17

In

addition,
the
LEROS-20
design
incorporates several features which reduce
manufacturing costs:

Again, we focused
identified earlier.

During this phase we concentrated on
understanding the "political" environment for
the mission and how it would affect our
mission design.
We recognised that any
technical solution would have to be acceptable
to the launch authority, At the outset we did
not know what launch vehicle we would be
using so we chose Vandenberg AFB launch
requirements as a baseline to work from
knowing that these would be representative of
those applied at other launch sites and
probably more constraining. This imposed
two important requirements that impacted our
mission architecture:

...;'

• Small
number
of
manufacturing
operations-there are only three.'welds
required on the entire thruster assemb'ly.

• iVa special manufacturing proceses
requiring specialised tools or fixturesinjector holes drilled with standard micro
drills rather than electro-discharge.
•

.lvfinimum

number of hot fire

'.'

tt}sts-

extensive use of water flo\v to qualitatively
and
quantitatively
evaluate
injector
performance.,
Finally, by working with RO on the' basic
procurement process for the engine we. have
devised a flexible set of requirements for
acceptance testing which gives us confi'dence
in the engine's performance while reducing
the final cost an additional 10%. Working
together we have devised the following
approach:

•

the cost drivers

Mission Definition

• Low total parts count-the entire thruster
assembly has only 5 parts.

on

•

•

At least 3 physical and electrical breaks
between
propellant tanks and the
combustion chamber.
At least 2 physical and electrical breaks
between high pressure gas and the outside.

Mission Design
Beginning with system specifications and
margins, based on lessons learned in low-cost
spacecraft hardware design, ample mass
margins for the propulsion system was
allowed. Total deployed mass of the satellite
was targeted to be < 250 kg with < 50 kg for
the "wet" mass of the propulsion system.
However, in every case, we were allowed to
trade-off mass for cost. The importance of this
mass flexibility can not be overstated. Having
the luxury of not having to count every gram
had a significant knock-on effect which
ultimately
lowered
the
system
cost.
Specifically, this allowed the use of:

Take maximum advantage of qualification
by similari(v-the LEROS-20 already has a
strong development heritage. This goes for
the engine valves which also have a proven
"
flight heritage.

• Reduce acceptance tests·-thruster and
valve acceptance tests would include
leakage and functional
tests . only.
Minimum number of hot-fire tests to verify
performance over blow-down range.

• Reduce performance requirements-accept
a nominal Isp of 290 sec vs. 293 sec.
Operate over established engine blowdown range of 20 to lObar inlet pressure
(total performance loss -7%).

•

Best of aIL this is a long-term solution which
can be adapted to a variety of future missions,
For these reasons, the LEROS-20 was chosen
as the main engine for the UoSAT-12 mission.

•

•

The UoSAT-12 Propulsion System
With the LEROS-20 selected as the 'main
engine, \ve turned our attention to reducing the
cost of the rest of the system for UoSkT-12.
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A "bang-bang" pressure control scheme in
place of a much more expensive regulator.
Cold-gas thrusters and nitrogen control
valves that could be selected based on
a"q.ilable, cost and reliability rather than
mass,
Tanks that could be manufactured using
off-the-shelf material to a higher than
necessary operating pressure reducing cost,
delivery time and the additional worry of
ensuring pressure compliance with tight
margins.
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•

•

sufficient nitrogen to operate over the
LEROS-20 blow down range of 20 to lObar.
Traditional designs would pressurise both
tanks from a common source. requiring the
addition of redundant check valves upstream.
By decoupling the tanks upstream. we
eliminate the possibility of propellant leaking
past check valves causing catastrophic
reaction.

Standard aerospace 37° flared fittings
instead of an all-welded construction. This
also greatly simplifies system integration.
Standard stainless steel line (pressure rated
to >5000 psi) throughout the~ystem
instead of lighter (but much: more
expensive) titanium line.

The complete system mass break-down in
shown in Table 6. While the actuaj"-mass
impact of our system engineering approach
easilty met our design goals, the overall
system mass exceeds the earlier estimate
(based on a more conventional apgroach
shown in Table 1) by about 38%. Ho!Vever,
this increase represents only about 2%. of the
deployed spacecraft mass. As we will see, this
overall approach has lead to a significa.nt cost
savings making it well worth it for our type of
low-cost programme.

Table 6: Mass breakdown/or UoSAT-12
propulsion system.

I

The complete system architecture is sh0wn in
Figure 7. The system includes several 'unique
features designed to make it simple, saf~, easy
to operate and low-cost.

Component

i

Unit Total I
Mass Mass
(kg) , (kg)

Liquid Engine
Propellant Tank

1
2

0.75
1.00

0.75
2.00

Nitrogen Tank
Accumulator/Ullage

I
6
2
6

3.36

3.36

0.5

3.0

0.9

1.8

0.23

1.38

Flow Restrictors

...

-'

0.15

0.45

Relief Valve

1

0.45

Filter
FillfDrain Valve

3

0.45
0.23

5

0.15

Cold-Gas Thruster

8

0.15

0.75
1.2

IUlbge tank 1,0 Valve

2

0.9

1.8

"Bang-bang" valves
Pressure Transducer

To begin with, the cold-gas system is
completely separate from the liquid system
(conventional systems would use a c6mmon
reservoir of pressurant gas). Pressure
regulation is achieved using two "bang-bang"
valves, controlled by feedback from a pressure
transducer. This gives the added advantage of
selectable pressure which allows us to vary the
cold-gas thruster torque on-demand.
.

1 Qty.

Total

0.69

17.63

Simple. one-shot burst disks are used
downstream of the tanks as an additional
isolator prior to tank pressurisation rather than
'more con1plex and expensive pyrotechnic
va·lves.

On the liquid side. each propellant tank is
individually pressurised at the beginning of
the mission to an initial blow-down ptessure.
No further tank pressurisation control or
operations are needed.

In addition. we evolved the following
redundancy philosophy which guided the
design of our propulsion system architecture:

This architecture decouples the propellant
tanks from the main N2 supply and includes
only enough nitrogen and ullage to initially
pressurise the tanks to blow-down pressure.
This has the advantage of not needing any
type of pressure regulation device for the
liquid system.

•

Inc lude

the minimum redundancy to
with range safety requirements.
Keep it simple-the fewer things there are
to go wrong, the less redundancy you need.
~pmply

•
•

The two ullage tanks. operating at
approximately 45 bar along with additional
ullage in each tank of around 2 litres, \ViII give
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Do not put redundant components
upstream of single-point failures.
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Figure 7: UoSAT-12 Propulsion System Architecture.
•

Where possible, allow for degraded
functional redundancy whereby a single
failure allows for continued, if somewhat
degraded, mission performance.

• Careful selection of components large
production runs (in some cases these may
already be in place to support larger, more
formal programs).
• No formal configuration management.
• No supplier data items (othe"i' than a
certificate of compliance).
• Supplier standard practices and pr.ocedures.

This philosophical approach was applied
throughout propulsion system design, from the
circuit board level to the tanks and is also
reflected in the overall mission design of
UoSAT-12.

Together with Arde, we have. carefully
evaluated the system requirements and relaxed
them when possible to arrive at an effective
design solution that could be delivered on
schedule. Low cost was the major driver in
the selection of the final approach and specific
components. To the greatest degree possible,
we are using existing hardware from those
suppliers with a known record for good quality
products to reduce risk during grout:!d testing.
and in flight.

All our efforts at reducing the cost in the
design would be for nought if we could not
actually procure the components in a low-cost
way, Fortunately, we were able to establish a
working relationship with Arde, Inc, of
Norwood, NJ, who, like us, were keenly
interested in cutting through the normal redtape found in space missions and focusing on
the essential elements to get a good product at
low cost.
Working with Arde, we have
developed a procurement strategy that
emphasises:

• The systems requirements were '~valuated
from the very beginning of the design phase to
allow the inclusion of selected key spacegrade components. These components would
require little or no analytical effort to
determine their structural and thermal
compatibility to the space environment. The

• Flexible system specification.
• Standard, proven designs for essential
modules with simple interfaces.
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has made fundamental progress on hydrogen
peroxide catalyst and
regression rate
characterisation. We have proven their basic
simplicity and performance and identified key
development issues for hybrid rocket upperstages. In addition, we have identified a small,
low-cost bi-propellant engine-the LEROS20-which can be easily adapted for a variety
of small satellite missions.
Finally, our
applied research focused on the propulsion
system for the upcoming VoSAT-12 mission
has given us practical experience in low-cost
propulsion system design and support
component procurement, We hope the lessons
learned on this mission can be adapted to
future small satellite missions, giving them a
low-cost enabling technology to take on a
variety of bold, new missions.

history of each component was used to
preclude unnecessary testing and its associated
cost. Actual component selection was made
using experienced engineering judgement
based on traditional space programs.
Simple and easily manufactured work
packages characterise the design of the
propulsion system. The entire system has
been broken into subassembly kits containing
all necessary tanks, valves, ullage/accumulator
bottles, pressure transducers, filters, flow
restrictors, burst disks and connectors. Each
kit can be assembled and tested at the factory.
Spacecraft integration will require the addition
of lines and mechanical brackets to hold the
components in place. This overall approach is
designed to support rapid system assembly and
testing, reducing cost as well as programme
risk.
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Future Work
Much work remains 011 the VoSA T-12
propUlsion system. A critical design review is
planned for the end of September with Arde to
review the overall system design and technical
solution. Hardware delivery is planned for the
end of January, 1996 with integration and
testing to follow to meet the October 1996
launch date.
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